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HARPEROONING, GROEING AND
BROWNING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Mark A. Graber*
Many scholars on the political left complain about the
"Lochnerization of the First Amendment."' Free speech has been
"Lochnerized" in their view, partly because the First Amendment is
presently interpreted as guaranteeing far more protection for the speech
of the politically powerful than for the speech of unpopular dissenters.
Recent Supreme Court decisions provide billionaires and corporations
with far more valuable expression rights2 than ordinary citizens who are
finding their capacity to reach audiences substantially curbed. 3 Free
speech has also been "Lochnerized" because contemporary free speech
law resembles Lochner v. New York' in crucial dimensions. Just as Justice Rufus Peckham in Lochner insisted that the Supreme Court had no
business leveling the contractual playing field, and should remain neutral
between employers and employees during the bargaining process,5 the
contemporary judicial majority maintains that federal justices have no
business leveling the political playing field and should remain neutral between the rich and poor, as well as between corporations and human beings, during the electoral process.6 Mark Tushnet observes, "[t]he First
Amendment (has) become this generation's vision of economic substan-

*

1. Morton J. Horwitz, Forward, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism , 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109 (1993). See David Kairys, Freedom of Speech , in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQ UE 190, 211 (David Kairys ed., 3rd ed. 1998) ("The First
Amendment as interpreted by today's conservatives constitutes a constitutional barrier to political
reform much like the constitutional barrier to economic reform erected by conservative justices in the
Lochner era of the early 1900s.").
2. See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653 (2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. See, e.g. , Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2011); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984).
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. Id. at 64.
6. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)
("[R]eject[ing] the premise that Government has an interest 'in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections. "').
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tive due process, a constitutional right restricting the ability of legislatures to regulate business. '' 7
Constitutional activists on the political left, who in the past sought
to Harperoon the First Amendment, are presently attempting to "gRoe''
and Brown the First Amendment. Progressive writings assert that the
main beneficiaries of free speech law ought to be the main beneficiaries
of such Supreme Court decisions as Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections," Roe v. Wade,Y or Brown v. Board of Education, 111 and that constitutional protections for free speech should be derived from the same
constitutional principles that justify the right to vote, the right to choose
to have an abortion and make other intimate decisions, or the rights associated with an anti-subordination interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.U Professor Alexander
Tsesis's Free Speech Constitutionalism 12 is an especially welcomed addition to this literature on the broader foundations of expression rights.
Tsesis is unusually self-conscious in his effort to link free speech theory
to fundamental constitutional principles. In sharp contrast to such scholars as John Hart Ely, David A.J. Richards, or Catharine McKinnon, who
attempt to Harperoon gRoe or Brown the First Amendment, 13 Tsesis offers the political left a way to integrate Harper, Roe, and Brown into a
constitutional whole.
Free Speech Constitutionalism maintains that constitutional protections for free speech are part of a basic regime project that predates the
Constitution. Tsesis writes, "[t]he values for which the First Amendment
stands should ... be understood in the context of a wider ideal of liberty
and equality that is derived from the nation's core principles as they are
set out in the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the
Constitution.'' 14 He recognizes the historical connections between the
First Amendment and significant progressive constitutional achievements. ''Freedom of speech was essential,'' Tsesis declares, for ''the advancement of civil rights, gender equality, and most recently, the gay
rights movement." 1' As important, Tsesis details the jurisprudential and
doctrinal connections between free speech rights and the other central
commitments of contemporary constitutional progressivism. He insists
7. Mark Tushnct, ffltroduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and the Information Fconomy, 127 HARV. L. Rf-V. 2234, 224t-i (2014).
8.

9.
10.
11 .

u.s.

31'13
663 (1966).
410U.S.113(1973).
347
41'13 (1954).
See notes 23-33, infra. For the anti-subordination interpretation of Brown. sec Jack M. Rat-

u.s.

kin and Reva R. Siegel. The American Civil RiJ?hts Tradition: Aflliclassification or Antis11bordination?,

51'\ U. MIAMI L. Rf-V. 9 (2003).
12.
13.
14.
15.

Alexander Tscsis. Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
See notes 23-33 and accompanying text, infra.
Tsesis, supra note 12, at 104.
!d. at 106.
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that free speech rights can be derived from the same principles that justify the right to vote, the right to choose an abortion or make other intimate decisions, and the right to not be the victim of racialized, genderized, or other forms of subordination. These constitutional commitments,
articulated by both the Declaration and Preamble,
recognize that humans have equal innate entitlements to pursue
happiness and that representative government is created to enact
institutions, laws and regulations effective in protecting those rights.
Such a regimen is not only good for persons atomistically but for
the national community because it recognizes that each of us has
the right to explore his or her unique life plan, including expressive
aims, without undue restraints. 16
In short, Tsesis would Harperoon, gRoe and Brown the First
Amendment.
Professor Tsesis's project of integrating the First Amendment into
broader constitutional theory is both necessary and problematic. Those
who Lochnerize, Harperoon gRoe, Brown or, for that matter, Hellerize
the First Amendment correctly recognize that no constitutional provision
is an island. Americans from the founding to the present have considered
free speech rights to be vital aspects of a more general constitutional project, even as Americans had disputed the nature of that project, the precise protections for free speech necessary for that project, the other
rights entailed by that project, and even whether that project requires
constitutional protections for free speech be explicitly enumerated. The
First Amendment nevertheless has always been somewhat insulated from
broader constitutional projects. Constitutional protections for free
speech have a partly autonomous doctrinal history and a partly distinctive mission that is partly subversive of all broader constitutional visions.
Constitutional free speech rights create a space in which citizens can
choose between the constitutional projects articulated in Lochner,
17
Harper, Roe, Brown, or Heller. Tsesis is right to acknowledge that the
reigning interpretation of free speech rights can never be entirely neutral
between competing constitutional projects, but nor should the First
Amendment be entirely subsumed by any particular constitutional project.
I. ACCESSORTZTNG THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Americans have historically made functional and doctrinal connections between free speech and other constitutional rights. Many com16.
17.

hi. at 105.
Or, JS I show later, some rnix of e ach.
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mentators believe broad free exercise rights are practical preconditions
to Americans enjoying any other constitutional right. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut declared the "freedom of thought and
speech" was "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom." 18 As often, commentators claim that free speech
rights are one aspect of a more general constitutional commitment, a
commitment that, depending on the commentator may generate such
rights as the freedom of contract, the right to vote, reproductive freedom,
racial equality, and even the right to bear arms.
The conservative libertarians of the nineteenth century Lochnerized
the First Amendment. They believed the Supreme Court should protect
the freedom of speech for the same reason that the Justices protected the
freedom of contract in Lochner v. New York. Both freedoms were aspects of the more general right to "be free in the enjoyment of all of
[one's] faculties." 19 Justice James McReynolds in Meyer v. Nebraska offered the classic expression of the connections between property rights
and speech rights when upholding the right to teach German. The liberty
protected by the due process clause, he declared
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. 2'l
Herbert Spencer insisted ''[t]he law of supply and demand extends
from the material sphere to the mental sphere.'' In his view, "as interference with the supply and demand of commodities is mischievous, so is
interference with the supply and demand of cultured faculty. ''! 1
New Deal and Great Society liberals Harperooned the First
Amendment. They believed the Supreme Court should protect the freedom for speech for the same reason that the Justices protected the right
to vote in Harper v. Virginia Board of ELections. Both are aspects of the
more general constitutional commitment to democratic majoritarianism.
The famous Carolene Products footnote is the classic expression of the
constitutional connections between voting rights and speech rights. Chief
Justice Stone suggested that "more exacting judicial scrutiny" might be
appropriate in the case of "legislation which restricts those political pro18.
19.
20.
21 .

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 31\1,326-27 (1937).
Allgeyer v. Louisiana , 165 U .S. 57il., 589 ( 1i'.Y7).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 3\10,39\1 (1\123).
Hl-'I~ HI-'RI'SPr.:..UR , FACTSA:..DC0MMEXIS!::3 (1902).
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cesses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable legislation,'' citing as examples judicial decisions in cases concerning "restrictions upon the right to vote" and "restraints upon the dissemination of information." 22 John Hart Ely claimed that Warren Court
decisions protecting expression and voting rights were both derived from
a judicial "desire to ensure that the political process ... was open to
those of all viewpoints on something approaching an equal basis." 2 '
Radical civil libertarians gRoe the First AmendmentY They believe
the Supreme Court should protect the freedom of speech for the same
reasons that the Justices protected the right to an abortion in Roe v.
Wade. Both rights are aspects of the more general constitutional commitment to individual self-development and the freedom to make certain
intimate choices. Justice William 0. Douglas in his concurrence in Doe v.
Bolton offered the classical expression of the constitutional connection
between speech and reproductive choice. His opinion interpreted the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting "autonomous
control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests,
tastes, and personality" 25 and from that commitment derived both the
right to political dissent and the right to terminate a pregnancy.26 David
A. J. Richards declares that government must show "respect for the independent moral judgment of each person, who must stand as ultimate
arbiter of conscience and of the legitimacy of the claims of state and
community," a principle from which he deduces rights to "sexual imagination and its expression. '' 27
Proponents of critical race and gender studies prefer to Brown the
First Amendment_Zo They believe the Supreme Court should protect the
freedom of speech for the same reason that the Justices protected racial
equality in Brown v. Board of Education. Both rights are aspects of a
more general constitutional commitment to anti-subordination or "the
universal right to self-respect and self-realization.'' 29 Mari Matsuda
champions the constitutional principle that "each person ... is entitled to
basic dignity, to nondiscrimination, and to the freedom to participate ful-

22. United States v. Carolcne Products , 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (l<J3X).
23 . JOH'< HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTIH:$'1'; A THEORY OF JL:DICIAI. REVIEW 74 ( l <J!)IJ).
24. For a brief discussion of radical civil libertarianism, sec Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New
Roffles: The Constitutional Sraws of Unconstitutional Speech, 48 VA'<D. L. RFv. 349. 356-59 ( I 995).
25. Doc v. Bolton , 410 U.S. 179,211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558. 562 (2003) (''Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought. belief.
expression , and certain intimate conduct.").
26. Doe, 410 U .S. at 211.
27. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOI.FR ATION Ar\D TH F COr\STI'l'UTIOr\ 207-01:: (1 9l\6).
21::. This paragraph borrows from the lengthier discussion in Graber, supra note 24, at 359-66.
29. Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First 1\mendment: Racist Speech and F.q1wf Uberty , 65 ST.
JOH'<'S L. REV. 119, 126 (1 Y<JI ).
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ly in society."111 Those who would Brown the First Amendment differ
from those who would Lochnerize, Harperoon, and gRoe the First
Amendment, in their greater willingness to invoke their master principles
for restricting expression rights. From the claim that Brown held that
''racism is a form of subordination that achieves its purposes through
group defamation," Charles Lawrence concludes that a Browned First
Amendment "commits us to some regulation of racist speech."'' "When
equality is recognized as a constitutional value and mandate,'' Catharine
MacKinnon agrees, "social inferiority cannot be imposed through any
means, including expressive ones."' 2
A growing strain in American constitutional thought Hellerizes the
First Amendment. Champions of an individual right to bear arms believe
the Supreme Court should protect the freedom of speech for the same
reason the Justices protected the right to bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller:' 3 Both rights are aspects of the more general constitutional
commitment to providing citizens with the means to resist tyranny.
Sanford Levinson suggests the connections between speech and gun
rights when he notes, ''just as ordinary citizens should participate actively
in governmental decision-making through offering their own deliberative
insights, rather than be confined to casting ballots once every two or four
years for those very few individuals who will actually make decisions, so
should ordinary citizens participate in the process of law enforcement
and defense of liberty rather than rely on professionalized peacekeepers,
whether we call them standing armies or police. ·•_\4 Glenn H. Reynolds
and Brannon P. Denning, more committed advocates of a broad interpretation of the right to bear arms, point out that "the First and Second
Amendments share a common liberty-protecting heritage, so that borrowing from the former to implement the latter naturally follows.""
II. THE TSESIS INTEGRATION

Professor Tsesis proposes to Harperoon , gRoe, and Brown the First
Amendment, but not Lochnerize or Hellerize free speech. He complains

30. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, in WORDS
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVH SPEECH , A~D TH H FIRST AMENIJME~T 4l\

( 1993).
31.
WORDS

Charles R Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers l£t Him Go: Ref?ulating Racist Speech on Campus, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAL:I :riVF SPEECH , A~D THE fiRST A\1H~IJMENT

THATW<)l: ~D:

75, 5X (1993),

32.

CATHA RI ~E

33.
34.

554

A.

MACKI~~O~ , O~I . Y

WORDS 1OX (1'!93).

u.s. 570 (2001))_

Sanford V. Levinson. The F:mbarrassing Second Amendment, 'J'J YALE L.J. 637. 650-51
(191>'!), For similar themes, sec L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Word.~. and Constiflltional Interp retation , 3X
WII.I.IA\1 A~D MAin L. Rr.v. 1311 ( 1997).
35. Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon P. Denning, How to Stop Worrying and l£am to Love the
Second Amendment: A Reply to Prof'essor Magarian, 91 TFx. L. RFv. See also 89, YO (201 3).
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that progressives who tie free speech closely to only one set of progressive constitutional commitments merely create larger constitutional islands. Too often, Tsesis maintains, while free speech scholars "accurately
portray some of the purposes protecting and advancing free speech,"
they ''think of them as independent values rather than part of a greater
scheme."36 If free speech is to be integrated with other liberal commitments, then free speech should be integrated with all liberal commitments. Hence, deriving free speech rights from the same underlying principle that justifies the right to vote, the right to an abortion, and the right
to desegregated schools or anti-subordination makes more sense than
closely connecting free speech with only one of these other rights, leaving
the others to fend for themselves.
A progressive theory of free speech, Professor Tsesis insists, should
be derived from the central principles of progressive constitutional
thought and be connected to all progressive values. He Harperoons the
First Amendment when declaring, "[f]ree speech is a necessary predicate
for members of a representative democracy to voice their separate opinions and to compromise in the interest of community unity.'' 37 He gRoes
the First Amendment when emphasizing the value of "expressive selfdefinition"'" and "the dignitary interest of each autonomous individual."'Y
He Browns the First Amendment when asserting that ''[c]itizens participating in majoritarian voting lack the electoral power to prevent equal
participation in public debate and self-expressions" 4u and that hate
speech that ''threatens the happiness of individuals and their allies, influences others to exclude identifiable groups, and disrupts multicultural
tranquility" is not constitutionally protected.4 1 Tsesis makes clear that the
Harper, Roe, and Brown dimensions of free speech stand together and
do not reflect independent constitutional commitments. His entire project, ''Free Speech Constitutionalism,'' can be deduced from ''the abstract
principle that government must protect equal rights in order to benefit
the common good.''42
Free Speech Constitutionalism is sharply critical of progressive theories of free speech that exclude some progressive constitutional commitments. Those who would Harperoon the First Amendment by focusing
on the role free speech plays in democratic majoritarianism overlook the
crucial role free speech plays as a means of human development. "It is
unfathomable to think,'' Tsesis declares, "the government could regulate
persons speaking to themselves in a bathroom, making mock gestures in
36.

Tscsis, supra note 12. at 113.
hi. at 107.
38. hi. at 113.
39. hi. at 114.
40. hi. at 12'!.
41. hi. at 147.
42. hi. at 103.
37.
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a closet while getting dressed, reading the lines of a seditious play to a
mirror, singing aloud in the woods, and yet none of them contribute to
participatory democracy." 43 Those who would only gRoe the First
Amendment by emphasizing the vital role of self-expression to the human personality undervalue the contribution free speech makes to democratic majoritarianism. Tsesis points out that the "self-fulfillment model
does not satisfactorily explain why free speech doctrine treats public defamation differently than the private variety, since in both types of defamation the speaker might personally enjoy spreading untrue statements
about the object of his anger. "44
Professor Tsesis does not Lochnerize or Hellerize the First
Amendment. Free Speech Constitutionalism does not discuss possible
connections between free speech and either the freedom of contract or
the right to bear arms, but Tsesis elsewhere makes clear that neither can
be derived as fundamental constitutional principles. He declares ''suspect ... the Court's attempt to link an individual's right to bear arms
with the Declaration of Independence." 45 He thinks Lochner analogous
to Dred Scott v. Sandford4(; as ''obvious examples of judicial manipulation
of the Constitution to suit the justices' political and economic
worldviews."47 For these reasons, progressive theories of free speech
need not integrate the freedom of contract or the right to bear arms into
a broader constitutional vision.
Nevertheless, Tsesis has provided persons who do not share his progressive constitutional vision with a road map for constructing a First
Amendment more true to their constitutional faith. Integrating the freedom of contract and the right to bear arms into a broader free speech
theory is not difficult. Those who would Lochnerize and those who
would gRoe the First Amendment differ for the most part only over the
rights they believe are necessary for human development. Justice
McReynolds thought such rights included the freedom of contract and
the freedom of speech. Justice Douglas thought such rights included the
right to intimate relationships and the freedom of speech. A libertarian
might think such rights include the freedom of contract, the right to intimate relationships, and the freedom of speech. 4x Those who would
Hellerize and those who would Harperoon the First Amendment differ
primarily over what rights they believe are necessary for a participatory

43 .
44.

hi. at 124.
hi. at 131.

45 . Alexander Tscsis. Seff-Govemment and the Declaration of' Independence, <)7 CORNFI.I. L.
RFV. 6<)3, 701 n.24 (2012).

46.

60

u.s. 393 (1~56).

47. Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitllfionafism: l.ibeml F.quafity for the Common Good, 91
TFX. L. RFV. 16()<), 1667 (2013).
4~. For one version of this argument, sec generally RANDY E. flARKFTT, RFSTORI'<G THF LOST
CONS ITI VI'H)K; THE PI~ESUMI"I'I<)K Of< LIHFR I'Y (revised cd. 2013).
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democracy to flourish. Pro-gun advocates believe the right to bear arms
furthers participatory democracy.49 Anti-gun advocates do not."'l
More generally, Professor Tsesis has provided a major challenge to
the dominant mode of constructing a constitutional theory of free
speech. Such classical free speech theorists as Alexander Meiklejohn and
Thomas Emerson began by exploring values free speech served and then
constructed free speech doctrine to serve those values.51 Free Speech
Constitutionalism begins from a better place. Professor Tsesis asks what
values the broader constitutional order serves and then constructs free
speech doctrine to serve those values. Progressives and non-progressives
who do not share Tsesis's interpretation of the Declaration of
Independence may nevertheless rely heavily on his method when developing theories of free speech that better integrated what they believe are
the most fundamental constitutional rights and norms.

III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A PARTLY AUTONOMOUS
CONSTITUTIONAL NORM

Free speech is not a constitutional island, but neither are constitutional visions undifferentiated land masses in which all provisions fit
seamlessly with each other. Constitutions are disharmonic, containing
provisions and strands that clash as often as they complement. 52 Speech
rights in disharmonic constitutions simultaneously promote and obstruct
various regime purposes. Sometimes, speech clauses contribute to a particular constitutional vision. At other times, free speech is the means by
which alternative constitutional visions are kept open. Even if at the present time we choose to Harperoon, gRoe, and Brown the First Amendment, the constitutional protections for free speech keep open the possibility that at a later date we may Lochnerize and Hellerize the First
Amendment.
Americans have consistently integrated free speech rights into the
broader constitutional themes of the day. 53 Conservative libertarians during the late nineteenth century integrated the freedom of speech and the
freedom of contract. New Deal and Great Society liberals integrated the
freedom of speech and the right to vote. Post-Great Society liberals
maintain that free speech rights are an aspect of the broader constitutional principles that justified constitutional rights to abortion and an an49. See Mich~el Steven Green , Why Protect Private 1\rms Possession? llline Theories of' the Second llmendment. 84 Ncrnu- DA\1F L. REv.l31, 172-73 (2008).
50. See Gregory P. M~garian , Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First 1\mendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49 (2012).
51. See THOMAS I. E\1ERSO~. TOWARD A GEI\FRAI. THFORY <W THE FIRST A\1FI\IJMENT
( 1966); AU-XANIJf-1~ MEIKLEJOHN , FI~FF SPEECH A~IJ ITS REI .ATIO~ TO SELF-GOVFRI\MENT (1948).
52. See GARY JEFFREY JACOHSOHI\, COI\STITUTIOI\AI. IDENTITY 4-5 (2010).
53 . See notes 1&-35 and accomp~nying text, infra.
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ti-subordination interpretation of Brown. Many contemporary opponents of gun control laws derive their broad interpretation of the Second
Amendment from the same principles they believe support free speech
rights.
Proponents of broad free speech rights before the late nineteenth
century similarly tied free speech rights to broader constitutional themes.
In defending John Peter Zenger, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the
close connection between free speech and jury trials. 14 The Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions weaved together free speech rights and the compact theory of the constitution.55 James Madison's "Report on the
Virginia Resolutions" noted how the American commitment to popular
sovereignty entailed a different understanding of free speech than the
English commitment to Parliamentary sovereignty. 56 Abolitionists closely
tied free speech rights to their anti-slavery commitments. 57 The motto of
the Free Soil party was ''Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, Free
Men." 5 ~ Michael Kent Curtis details how these connections between
speech rights and anti-slavery structured the post-Civil War
Amendments. 59
Other strands of free speech thinking and doctrine are largely independent of broader constitutional themes. From Tunis Workman to
Thomas Emerson, scholars have produced major tomes devoted exclusively to free speech problems.M• Emerson's The System of Freedom of
Expression is devoted entirely to role free speech plays in a constitutional democracy, and not to any broader constitutional vision.~> Although he
played an active role in the fight to constitutionalize a right to birth control,62 Emerson's writings on free speech do not connect Griswold v.
Connecticuf'3 and the First Amendment.<" First Amendment rights in the
1

54. See JOHI'\ PET!-'!~ ZEI'\Gl-'R, A Bl~ll-'1' NARRA'IIVE OF I'Hl-' CASE Al'\D TRIAl. <)I' JOH" Pl-'Tl-'1~
ZENGER (London 173:-1) (Paul Finklcman cd. 2010).
55 . See Henry Steele CommJger, The Kenfllcky and Virginia Resolutions of' 1798, in
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICA" HISTORY 17:-1--l-)3 (Henry Steele Commagcr ed., 7th ed. 1%2).
56. James Madison. Mr. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resollltions, 2 THE ExA\1 I"ER A"n J.
POL. Eco".6S (Condy Ragueted. 11>35).
57. MICHAl-'!. Kl-'1'\ I' CL:RTIS, FREE SPEECH, "TH!-' PH)PU·.'S DARI.I"(i PI~IVII.f-.(if-.;" S muGGU-S
FOR FR!-'1-'DOM OF EXPRFSSIO" IN AM!-'RICA" HISTORY 216-'-Jl} (2010).
51>. THH)I)()RE CI.AI~Kl-' SMI I'H, THE LIHERTY Al'\D FREE SOil. PARTIES i " TH f-. NOR I'HIVEST 14\l
(1:-197).
59. Curtis, supra note 57, Jt 357--l-)3.
60. See TL:"IS WORK\1A", A TREATISE CO"CER"ING POLITICAL E"OLIRY A" I) '!'HE LIHFRTY
OF THE PR!-'SS (1):100); TH0\1AS l. E\1EI~SON, THE SYS'l'FM OF FI~FFDOM OF EXPR!-'SSI<)l'\ (1'!70).
61. Emerson discussed the role other constitutional provisions played in maintaining speech
rights. hut not the ways in which speech rights maintained values advanced by other constitutionJI
provisions. See, e.g., EM!-'RSO", supra note 60, at 3-20.
62. See DAVII) J. (;ARROW, LIHEinY & Sl-'XL:AUTY: THE RIGH 1''1'0 PI~IVACY AND 'I HE MAKII'\(i
<W ROr. v. WIIIJI-'231-3:-1 (1Y'J4).
63 . 3:-11
479 (1965).

u.s.
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cia\ equality or free speech without mention of the other, both racial
equality and free speech have distinctive and partly autonomous developmental paths.' 1
The partial autonomy of the First Amendment reflects the distinctive role free speech plays in American constitutionalism, The constitutional visions underlying Lochner, Brown, Roe, Harper, Heller and other
constitutional decisions are not as etched in constitutional stone as is a
single-executive or, better yet, state equality in the Senate. The latter are
part of ''the constitutional of settlement'' 72 that cannot be changed without a constitutional amendment (if even that) in the case of state equality
in the Senate. The former are part of "the constitution of conversation,"7 '
interpretive choices that Americans are free to revise in light of changed
and perhaps better constitutional commitments. These conversations
about the fundamental constitutional norms that should guide the proper
interpretation of the First Amendment do not take place in an entirely
neutral marketplace of constitutional ideas. A constitutional regime that
is committed to the freedom of contract and the right to an abortion, but
not an anti-subordination understanding of equality or the right to bear
arms will Lochnerize and gRoe the First Amendment, but not
Harperoon, Hellerize, or Brown free speech. The resulting constitutional
choices will privilege practices that reinforce existing constitutional
commitments while placing new obstacles to achieving alternative constitutional visions. Given that all ideological schemes are "mobilizations of
bias,'' 74 such privileging is inevitable. Nevertheless, free speech also
stands for the principle that government may not entrench a particular
constitutional vision, that the First Amendment must always be interpreted as providing dissenters from the dominant regime commitments
with a fair, if imperfect, opportunity to persuade others to adopt an alternative constitutional vision. Even if we prefer to adopt Tsesis's theory
of free speech that privileges commitments to democratic majoritarianism, personal development and antisubordination, the First Amendment
reminds us that we must nevertheless permit some speech that risks antidemocratic outcomes, hinders personal development, and silences some
speakers. If, after all, progressives are committed to free speech, that
commitment entails a confidence that on a not totally slanted marketplace of ideas, the progressive vision that Harperoons, gRoes, and
Browns the constitution and First Amendment will be more persuasive

71 . One might note that war has been especially good for racial equality, but not so good for free
speech.
72. Sanford V. Levinson. What are We to Do 11bow D}~~timction? Reflections on Stmctural Constitlltional Change and the Irrelevance of Clever Lawyering, Y4 Bosror-; U.L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2014).
73 . hi.
74. See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDE R, THE SE MI-SOVEREIGN P EOPLE: A REALIST'S V I EW O F
D E MOCRACY I N A\1ERI CA 6Y (1%0).
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than a conservative vision that Lochnerizes and Hellerizes the constitution and First Amendment. 75

75 .

See (;r~bcr, supra note 24, at 3!)3-!)9.

